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Abstract
Investors would analyze the reporting of segments disclosure in the notes to the
financial statements, addition to the main reporting that presents earnings and
cash flows. We investigated the relationship between the segment disclosure level
and the earning quality that could decrease the cost of equity. Sample of this
research were 242 firms-years of manufacture industry firms. This research used
simultaneous test; the first stage was a regression of segment disclosure level on
earning quality and the second stage was a regression on the cost of equity. Seg-
ment disclosure level was measured from PSAK 5 Operating Segment (2009); the
cost of equity measured using industry-adjusted E/P Ratio; earning quality mea-
sured using absolute of accrual quality and absolute of abnormal accrual. We
found that earnings quality positively influences on segment disclosure level. We
proved that there was a complementary effect between them. The second result
showed that the segment disclosure level decreases the cost of equity, but margin-
ally. The third result proved that in the second order condition, the segment dis-
closure level was stronger in decreasing the cost of equity. We proved that there
was endogeneity of segment disclosure level in decreasing cost of equity.
Keywords: Cost of Equity; Earning Quality; PSAK 5; Segment Disclosure Level
JEL Classification: C34, D23, M14
Citation: Khomsatun, S., Siregar, S. V., & Utama, S. (2018). Relationship of earnings qual-
ity and segment disclosure in decreasing cost of equity. Jurnal Keuangan dan
Perbankan, 22(3), 456-474. https://doi.org/10.26905/jkdp.v22i3.2304
Abstrak
Investor akan menganalisis pelaporan pengungkapan segmen dalam catatan atas laporan
keuangan, selain pelaporan utama yang menyajikan laba dan arus kas. Kami menginvestigasi
hubungan tingkat pengungkapan segmen dengan kualitas laba dalam menurunkan biaya
modal ekuitas. Sampel penelitian ini sebanyak 242 perusahaan-tahun yang mengambil
industri manufaktur. Penelitian ini menggunakan pengujian simultan, dengan first-stage
merupakan regresi tingkat pengungkapan segmen atas kualitas laba serta second-stage
adalah regresi biaya modal ekuitas. Tingkat pengungkapan segmen menggunakan ceklis
dari PSAK 5 Segmen Operasi (2009), biaya modal ekuitas diproksikan dengan industry-
adjusted E/P Ratio, serta kualitas laba diproksikan dengan nilai absolut kualitas akrual
dan absolut akrual abnormal. Kami menemukan bahwa kualitas laba berpengaruh positif
terhadap tingkat pengungkapan segmen. Kami membuktikan adanya efek komplementer
antara keduanya. Hasil kedua menunjukkan bahwa tingkat pengungkapan segmen dapat
menurunkan biaya modal ekuitas secara marginal. Hasil ketiga, membuktikan bahwa pada
second-stage tingkat pengungkapan segmen lebih kuat memengaruhi penurunan biaya
modal ekuitas dan terbukti melengkapi (komplementer) kualitas laba dalam menurunkan
biaya modal ekuitas. Kami membuktikan adanya endogenitas tingkat pengungkapan segmen
dalam kaitan kualitas laba dan penurunan biaya modal ekuitas
Kata Kunci: Biaya Modal Ekuitas; Kualitas Laba; PSAK 5; Tingkat Pengungkapan
Segmen
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Information published by the company has to pro-
vide added value for investors to take the precise
decision. Brown & Hillegeist (2009) states that there
are three pieces of information used by investors in
evaluating the investing of funds, i.e., earning in-
formation, cash flow, and segment reporting. There-
fore, in addition to the main reporting that presented
earnings and cash flows, investors will analyze the
segment reporting disclosed in notes to the finan-
cial statements.
Previous studies have investigated the use and
advantage of cash flow and earnings information
by investors (Chen & Zhang, 2003; Subramanyam &
Venkatachalam, 2007; Susan, 2009). Earnings are
considered more able to provide information than
cash flow because of the accruals that have the pre-
diction power. However, on the other hand, cash
flow may be better because the accruals of earnings
may allow discretion from managers that can result
in improper decision making. For the proper deci-
sion, the investor needs a quality of earning infor-
mation with a little discretion. Barth, Konchitchki,
& Landsman (2013) state that transparency of earn-
ings reporting quality can persuade investors to
make transactions and investments that are result-
ing in lowering the cost of capital.
For the business competition, many compa-
nies develop product and geographic diversification.
Bens, Berger, & Mohahan (2011) conclude that the
company with multiple segments discloses segment
reporting more transparent and less discretion that
single segment. The broad scope of the company’s
business allows financial statements users to require
more detailed information, such as segment report-
ing for their investment analysis (Chen & Zhang
2003; Suryandari & Arisanti, 2017). For business
development strategies and investment efficiency,
the companies require substantial funding with a
lower cost. The company that reported the detailed
product and geographical segment can provide
more transparent and credible information. It may
affect the investors can make accurate and precise
decisions (Tsakumis, Doupnik, & Seese, 2006). A
better segment disclosure quality will be an attrac-
tion for investors to place their funds that could be
lowering the cost of equity capital.
Some researcher has investigated implemen-
tation of international financial reporting standard
(IFRS) 8: Operating segment in Europe that has been
effective since 2009 (Crawford, Helliar, & Power,
2010; Crawford et al., 2012; Heem & Valenza, 2012;
Nichols, Street, & Cereola, 2012; Moldovan, 2014).
The study of IFRS 8 also has been investigated in
non-Europe sample (Mardini, 2012; Kang & Gray,
2014; Kumar & Sridharan, 2014).
Accounting standards have regulated segment
disclosures. However, there are still problems in the
implementation of segment disclosures. Alfaraih &
Alanezi (2011) find that segment disclosure is still
not in accordance with applicable standards. Alfaraih
& Alanezi (2011) then highlight that standard com-
pliance in developing countries is still not good, but
there is not much research in developing countries
on this matter.
Indonesia is one of developing countries that
are also adopting IFRS. The adoption of the stan-
dard perhaps increases the earning quality. For the
guidance of segment reporting, Financial Account-
ing Standard Board of Indonesian Accounting As-
sociation (Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan,
DSAK-IAI) regulated and published segment report-
ing and disclosures in the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (PSAK) 5: Operating Segment
in 2009 for Indonesian Company. PSAK 5 Operat-
ing Segment (Revised 2009) revises PSAK 5 Segment
Reporting (2000), and it has been active since 2011.
PSAK 5 (Revised 2009) adopts the International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 Operating Seg-
ment. A new standard or a revised standard may
increase transparency or financial reporting, and it
needs further investigation.
Some Indonesian researchers have explored
segment reporting, but the investigation of segment
reporting for Indonesian company still limited. The
studies of segment reporting on Indonesian com-
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pany are the determinants and impacts on market
responses (Fitriany & Aulia, 2009; Pratiwi & Palupi,
2017), investor response and perception of segment
reporting (Dermawan, Haryanto, & Yuniarwati,
2014; Suryandari & Arisanti, 2017), determinants of
the segment profit variation (Bestari & Siregar, 2012;
Wahyudi & Widaningsih, 2016), as well as the de-
terminants and the impact on the cost of equity capi-
tal (Muhammad & Siregar, 2014; Abbas, Habbe, &
Pontoh, 2015). Two studies related to the disclo-
sure of segments to the cost of equity capital expe-
rienced results that are still inconclusive. Overseas
research such as Krabbenborg (2012), Saini &
Hermann (2012), and Semenenko & Yoo (2012) also
find that the quality of segment disclosure nega-
tively impacts the cost of equity capital.
The previous description provides findings
that both earning quality and segment disclosure/
reporting can reduce the cost of capital (Krab-
bennorg, 2012; Saini & Hermann, 2012; Semenenko
& Yoo, 2012; Barth, Konchitchki, & Landsman, 2013;
Muhammad & Siregar, 2014; Triningtyas & Siregar,
2014; Abbas, Habbe, & Pontoh, 2015; Persakis &
Iatidris, 2015; Lahaya, 2017) although some studies
have not found these results (Muhammad & Siregar,
2014; Mulyati, 2017). The evidence indicates that the
information can be used jointly or used interchange-
ably by the investor. Segment disclosure is a detail
performance report of each segment owned by the
company. As for earning reported on the income
statement is accumulated from company segments.
It supports the argument that if the company report
more is eligible, it also will disclose segment report-
ing more transparent and detail. Thus, the prior find-
ings indicate that there are relationships between
the earning quality and segment disclosure quality
in affecting the cost of equity capital.
Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) study on the
effect of complementary or substitution of earnings
quality and disclosure in decreasing the cost of eq-
uity capital. In this study, they use voluntary dis-
closures from Botosan (1997) research. Their results
suggest that voluntary disclosure has a complemen-
tary effect on earnings quality and jointly lowers
the cost of equity capital. From the results of the
study, it is expected that segments disclosure also
has a complementary with the quality of earnings
in decreasing the cost of equity capital. Although
standards regulate segment disclosures, some re-
searchers find that companies are still diverse in
disclosing this segment’s information.
Blanco, Lara, & Tribo (2014) found that earn-
ing quality influence segment disclosure. That is, if
the earning quality affects the level of disclosure
segment, while both affect the decreasing in the cost
of equity. Its relationship allows that there is a si-
multaneous effect both of them in affecting the cost
of equity. Based on the description findings, this
study intends to investigate the relationship between
earnings quality and segment disclosure level to
lower the cost of equity capital.
The previous evidence and the limited study
of segment reporting in Indonesian companies have
given the motivation to continue the study. Sanjaya
& Barus (2017) conclude that the cost of capital was
lower for after IFRS adoption. Their finding impli-
cates that PSAK 05 implementation will also reduce
of cost of equity capital. But, according to Muhammad
& Siregar’s research (2014) manufacturing compa-
nies in Indonesia still do not all implement segment
disclosures as regulated by PSAK 5 Operating Seg-
ment (Revised 2009). PSAK 5 Operating Segment
(Revised 2009) is the result of the adoption of IFRS
8 operating segment. The study used the period
before and when applied PSAK 5 Operating Seg-
ment (Revised 2009). So that further research is
needed to answer the non-influence of segment dis-
closures on the cost of equity capital. The link be-
tween the uses of this two information as stated by
Brown & Hillegeist (2009), this study intends to
answer whether investors use quality earnings in-
formation and segment disclosure so that it will re-
duce the cost of equity capital in Indonesian manu-
facturing companies. Indonesia, in general, found
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that the higher the cost of capital in a company, the
impact is significant enough for investment, where
at least companies make a public offering of shares,
and the low activity of companies to raise funds
(Indayani & Mutia, 2013).
The agency theory arises because of the sepa-
ration of ownership by the principal and the man-
agement by the agent of an enterprise (Fama &
Jensen, 1983). The agency problem may be arisen
because of differences in individual interests be-
tween them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It is under
one of the assumptions in which humans have the
property to be more self-interested than others (self-
interest). It will make the agent does not always do
the best for the principal interest (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
The concept of agency theory describes that
the owner bears the agency’s cost of supervision;
and the agent must issue a bonding expenditure
which ensures that his actions do not harm the
owner and residual loss if the agent’s decision is
not following the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Principal supervision could be done with the access
of financial and non-financial information of the
company. The more transparent the information will
provide the easier oversee and supervision.
However, agents that have access to the in-
formation do not always disclose the details of the
company’s information to the owner/investor that
resulting in imbalance information or referred to as
information asymmetry. According to Scott (2012),
two kinds of information asymmetry is, first, the
adverse selection of the condition of the agent has
more information than the principal or external par-
ties. Second is the moral hazard is the condition of
the agent can freely do things that may violate the
contract without being noticed by the principal.
For reducing information asymmetry, Healy
& Palepu (2000) says needing regulation to disclose
private information. Disclosures are additional in-
formation that complements the financial statements
and can inform more details. Thus, investors can
access information easily and cheaply that it will
make lower the cost of equity capital for the com-
pany. Brown & Hillegeist (2009) found that the level
of disclosure quality decreases information asym-
metry. Companies can provide additional informa-
tion through more detailed disclosure, not just main
reports. Segment information contributes to provid-
ing information on the distribution of earnings, both
product and geographically diversified.
The standard regulates segment information
in the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(Indonesian SFAS, as known by PSAK) 5: Segment
Operations (Revised 2009) which revised PSAK 5:
Segment Reporting (Revised 2000). PSAK 5 Segment
Report (2000) adopts SFAS 131 (from US GAAP).
While PSAK 5 Segment Operations (Revised 2009)
adopted IFRS 8 Segment Operation. One of the re-
vised points of PSAK 5 (Revised 2009) is the report-
ing of activities that generate revenue and expenses
as well as segment assets and liabilities. There is
also a reconciliation of total revenues, profits or to-
tal profits or losses, assets, liabilities, and other
material elements between segments and entities
(PSAK 5, 2009). Segment classifying is based on the
similarity characteristics of the nature of the prod-
uct and service, the nature of the production pro-
cess, the type or group of customers, the method
for the distribution of products and services, if ap-
plicable the nature of the regulatory environment,
e.g. banking, insurance, or public utilities (paragraph
12). The classification uses both quantitative and
qualitative (principle based) threshold rules.
More, PSAK 5 (Revised 2009) also provides
for the definition of an operating segment based on
an entity component that is directly involved in
obtaining revenue and expenses. It means that the
head office which is the administrative office with-
out generating revenue is not formed and reported
by operating segment (Paragraph 60). The opera-
tional decision makers regularly review the results
of the operations, as well as there is disclosure of
financial information.
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Based on the PSAK, it can be concluded that
the decision to present and divide a segment de-
pends on the management that may have different
intentions. There will be differences between com-
panies with signaling motivation and the consider-
ation of proprietary cost theory. Besides, the result-
ing information viewed from the entity level can be
differentiated into information about products/ser-
vices and/or geographic areas as well as key cus-
tomers. Segregation of product and geographical
segments can provide additional information for
analysts, investors and potential investors.
Segment information describes the diversifi-
cation strategy. Chen & Zhang (2003) argue that seg-
ment data offers information on investment oppor-
tunities between segments due to different levels
of profit and growth potential across segments.
They explained that segment reporting presents in-
formation on profitability, risk, growth character-
istics different between segments that could not be
identified from the consolidated report. Thus, the
company also does not longer hide the income state-
ment of the segment that suffered losses. Chen &
Zhang (2003) also add the explanation that segment
reporting gives incremental value with inter-seg-
ment profit divergences.
Segment disclosure is considered to reduce
information asymmetry because it reports in detail
of the revenue and expense information of each seg-
ment to investors. Saini & Hermann (2012) find evi-
dence that segment disclosure level decreases in-
formation asymmetry. Thus, segment reporting is
considered to reduce the cost of capital. Abbas,
Habbe, & Pontoh (2015) find evidence that segment
quality decreases the cost of equity capital in public
companies in Indonesia. Previously, Muhammad &
Siregar (2014) using different measurements, found
no evidence of segment disclosure relationship and
equity capital cost. The inconclusive evidence from
Indonesian company gives the other researchers to
continue the exploration of the relationship.
The financial information of the company can
be used if it is qualified. A conceptual framework
of the financial statements states that the financial
statements may be used when they have relevance
and reliability information. Both of them determine
the quality of information. Relevance and reliabil-
ity are the fundamental of characteristic qualitative
of the information. Dechow & Schrand (2004) de-
fines earning quality as a measure of whether earn-
ings reported reflecting the firm’s performance.
When a company provides a good profit, it can be
used in decision making, for example for investment
activities.
Information quality has been investigated
because profit is a critical element in investment
analysis. Francis et al. (2005) find that good accrual
quality will reduce the risk of information that will
ultimately lower the cost of equity capital. Further-
more, Gray, Koh, & Tong (2009) continue the study
of Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) by taking dif-
ferent the sample. The results of Gray, Koh, & Tong
(2009) support the research of Francis, Nanda, &
Olsson (2008). Triningtyas & Siregar (2014) also find
evidence in Indonesia that the accrual quality (the
proxy of earnings quality) affects the cost of equity
capital.
The general purpose of this research is to
know the relationship between the segment disclo-
sure level and earning quality in decreasing equity
capital cost. The specific purpose of the research is,
firstly to know the role of earnings quality in influ-
encing segment disclosure level. Secondly, to know
the impact of the segment disclosure level on the
cost of equity capital. The third objective is to know
the relationship between earnings quality and the
segment disclosure level in influencing the cost of
equity capital.
This study is expected to provide new evi-
dence how the usage of both information by inves-
tors, that is the evidence of the relationship between
earning quality and segment disclosure level in af-
fecting the cost of equity capital. Thus, the company
can pay attention to segment disclosure and report
by providing more detailed information because of
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it will impact back to the company, i.e., the declin-
ing in the cost of equity capital. Likewise, investors
can use the quality segment and profit information
for their investment analysis. The study is also ex-
pected to provide evidence of compliance with PSAK
5 Operating Segment (Revised 2009) which is the
adoption of IFRS 8 and its impact on the decrease in
equity capital costs. Also, this study can also prove
the existence of endogenous levels of segment dis-
closure.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Previous research suggests that information
quality is an exogenous variable concerning volun-
tary disclosure (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008).
Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) also add that man-
ager intention in providing quality information in-
fluences with the decision to disclose information.
Thus, they also emphasize that disclosure levels are
endogenous variables. Segment disclosure is a man-
datory type of disclosure that arranged by the stan-
dard. However, in decision making to disclose, it is
influenced by management considerations (Nichols
& Street, 2007). The manager intentions may influ-
ence the earning quality. The evidence indicates that
segment disclosure is also an endogenous variable
that is influenced by the quality of information.
Wang et al. (2011) and Blanco, Lara, & Tribo
(2014) state that segment disclosure reduces infor-
mation asymmetry and agency costs. On the other
hand, earning quality also decreases information
asymmetry and are considered to represent infor-
mation asymmetry (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008;
Blanco, Lara, & Tribo, 2014). Therefore, when the
earnings quality is better, the company is not likely
to hide the information and will reveal more de-
tails of company information.
While there is a possibility of proprietary cost
in disclosing segment information, the company has
a desire to give signaling with a detailed disclosure
of its business unit’s line. If the company commit to
reporting qualified earning with the little discretion,
the companies could increase the segment disclo-
sure as a signal to investors. Segment disclosure
decisions are not only due to changes in standards
and company characteristics (Lucchese & Carlo,
2012; Pardal & Morais, 2012; Saarilouma, 2013;
Ibrahim, 2014), but also manager’s policies (Abbas,
Habbe, & Pontoh, 2015). You (2012) and Lail, Tho-
mas, & Winterbotham (2013) stated that the quality
of segment disclosure could be discretion by man-
agers because of changes in segment aggressiveness,
transfer of loads and other changes that are not vis-
ible. Therefore, segment disclosure depends on the
high level of discretion by the manager. Based on
the explanation, the following is the Hypotheses 1:
H1: earning quality influence positively on seg-
ment disclosure level
Segment disclosure is mandatory. Neverthe-
less, the 2010 Reports on the Observance of Stan-
dards and Codes (ROSC) of Indonesia indicates that
the company has not disclosed segment informa-
tion entirely following the standards (Muhammad
& Siregar, 2014). In Indonesia, the report is sup-
ported by research by Muhammad & Siregar (2014)
which find that the average disclosure level of manu-
facturing companies listed on BEI (2010-2011)
amounted to 65 percent. This figure indicates that
although regulated, not all companies disclose fol-
lowing PSAK 5.
The 2010 Reports on the Observation of Stan-
dards and Codes (ROSC) of Indonesia shows that
the company has not disclosed segment informa-
tion fully in accordance with the standards (Muhammad
& Siregar, 2014). In Indonesia, the report is sup-
ported by Muhammad & Siregar (2014) research
which found the average disclosure level of manu-
facturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange 2010-2011 amounted to 65 percent. This
figure adds the evidence that some companies do
not report detailed information of segment disclo-
sure.
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Shehata (2014) describes that disclosure is a
signaling tool for assessing companies. A proper
disclosure level will inform the user transparently
that resulting in minimizing of the information asym-
metry. Thus, the investor can decide without the
expensive cost. If investors get easy access to infor-
mation, it will efficiently conduct transactions that
will increase the value and lower the cost of equity
capital. Botosan (1997) is a preliminary researcher
who finds that voluntary disclosure from the com-
panies with little analyst following decreases the cost
of equity capital. This finding indicates that inves-
tors will rely on disclosure information in addition
to information other than the items available in the
financial statements.
Although prior research is still not conclusive,
it is possible that the segment disclosure level may
affect the declining in the cost of equity capital.
Moreover, Brown & Hillegeist (2009) state that seg-
ment information is one of three crucial informa-
tions used by investors in making investment deci-
sions. Pelaez, Lara, & Gine (2009), Krabbenborg
(2012), Saini & Hermann (2012), Semenenko & Yoo
(2012), and Abbas, Habbe, & Pontoh (2015) also find
that segment disclosure is proved to lower the cost
of equity capital.
As stated by Abbas, Habbe, & Pontoh (2015),
the relationship between segment disclosure and
cost of equity capital is explained by agency theory
framework. High level of segment disclosure qual-
ity will decrease information asymmetry. Higher
disclosure of segments will further assist investors
in analyzing the risks of economic investment. In-
vestors more easily make securities transactions and
investments. The high demand for securities will
lead to an increase in stock prices that indicate a
decrease in the cost of equity capital. Thus, it could
be hypothesized, that:
H2.: segment disclosure level influences negatively
on the cost of equity capital
Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) reveal there
are two views on the relationship between earn-
ings quality and voluntary disclosure. First, infor-
mation asymmetry between the insider and the
shareholder causes the demand for disclosure in-
formation and gives the company incentives to dis-
close as the added value of the information is greater
(Verrecchia, 1983). The implication is a company with
poor (good) earnings quality will publish more (a
little) disclosures due to information asymmetry
between firms and high (low) investors. Thus, in
these circumstances, the relationship between earn-
ings quality and disclosure is considered a substitu-
tion relationship.
The second opinion of Francis, Nanda, &
Olsson (2008) that improved information quality
provides an incentive for managers to provide as
much information through disclosure (Verrecchia,
1983). Heitzman, Wasley, & Zimmerman (2010) also
state that disclosure decisions depend on the mate-
riality and incentives the company receives. In this
view, the companies with poor (good) earnings qual-
ity will issue fewer (more) disclosures as investors
treat such disclosure as less (more) credible infor-
mation. The relationship of them is considered a
complementary relationship.
Both opinions may also apply to the relation-
ship of earnings quality and segment disclosure.
Companies require segment disclosures as stan-
dards rule them. However, managers still have the
option to disclose segments, for example in quanti-
tative restrictions of forming the segment that is 10
percent of the total revenue of all operating seg-
ments leaving options. If they do not meet the re-
quired limit, the segment may be disclosed with the
consideration that the manager believes the infor-
mation is beneficial to external users. The consider-
ation of managers effects the variation of forming
and disclosing segment operation. Thus, better seg-
ment disclosures and reporting complement the
earning quality in affecting the decrease in the cost
of equity capital. In addition, the basic formation of
the segment also depends on the company’s deci-
sion. It may also depend on how the company man-
ages their earning.
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In effect the cost of equity capital, these two
variables can lower the cost of equity capital even
though the results are still not conclusive, especially
for segment disclosure. Francis, Nanda, & Olsson
(2008) state that earning quality depends on volun-
tary disclosure affecting the cost of equity capital.
It means that the effect of earnings quality on dis-
closure is a first-order effect, while the disclosure
level is a second order effect in affecting the de-
crease in equity capital cost. So, the impact of earn-
ings quality on the cost of equity capital can be
through the segment disclosure level as a first-or-
der effect that is also influenced by the quality of
earnings. In this case, the existence of the disclo-
sure level and the earning quality will have simul-
taneous (complimentary) or complementary effects
on the decreasing in the cost of equity capital. The
impact of the disclosure level in decreasing the cost
of equity capital is triggered or influenced by good
earnings quality. Based on the description, we for-
mulate a hypothesis as follows:
H3: earning quality influences indirectly on the
cost of equity capital using segment disclo-
sure level as mediating variable
METHODS
The data in this research is secondary data.
The accounting and capital market data are from
Thomson Reuters (Datastream), and the data for
segment disclosures comes from the company’s fi-
nancial statements. Data of the sample research de-
termination are from the website of the Indonesia
Stock Exchange (BEI).
The sample in this study is a manufacturing
company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX) with the period 2011-2013. The object of re-
search is a manufacturing company because manu-
facturing companies process raw materials into fin-
ished materials that would often produce new prod-
ucts. The new product has resulted in diversified in
different operating segments. The manufacturing
company has also been selected for the research
because it is an industry with a large number of com-
panies. Selection sample in one industry is because
of similarities between the accounts and type of
business that will produce in the similarity of prop-
erties in the disclosure segment. What we start of
2011 is because it is the first year of SFAS 5 (Revised
2009) effectively implemented. Although the study
period 2011-2013, the research data requires the
period t + 1. The research conducted in 2014 is the
last year of data availability and also that PSAK 05
re-revised in 2015.
The general hypothesis of this study is to get
evidence on whether the complementary effect be-
tween the quality of earnings and the disclosure of
segments in reducing the cost of capital. To answer
the hypothesis, we use two-stage least square (TSLS)
for mediating variable. The model TLSL also refers
to Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) that investigat-
ing using a mediating model with TLSL. However,
we need several research models to answer the spe-
cific hypotheses as stated in the previous section.
The followings are model 1 for answering H1; model
2 for answering H2, and model 3 is the second stage-
order model that continuing the first stage model
(model 1):
(1)
(2)
(3)
ܵܧܩܦܫܵܥ݅ݐ =    ߙ0 + ߙ1ܧ ݅ܳݐ + ߙ2ܣܷܦ݅ݐ + ߙ3ܵܫܼܧ݅ݐ +
ߙ4ܣܩܧ݅ݐ + ߙ5ܮܧܸ݅ ݐ + ߙ6ܮܫ ݅ܳݐ + ߝ݅ݐ
  
 
ܥܱܧܥ݅ݐ =         ߚ0 + ߚ1ܵܧܩܦܫܵܥ݅ݐ + ߚ2ܵܫܼܧ݅ݐ +
ߚ3ܴܱܣ݅ݐ + ߚ4ܩܴܱܹܶܪ݅ݐ + ߚ5ܯܶܤܸ݅ ݐ +
ߝ݅ݐ   
 
ܥܱܧܥ݅ݐ =          ߛ0 + ߛ1ܵܧܩܦܫܵܥ෣ ݅ݐ + ߛ2ܧ ݅ܳݐ  ++ߛ3ܵܫܼܧ݅ݐ + ߛ4ܴܱܣ݅ݐ + ߙ5ܩܴܱܹܶܪ݅ݐ +
ߛ6ܯܶܤܸ݅ ݐ + ߝ݅ݐ     
 
Where:
SEGDISC : segment disclosure
EQ : earning quality, measured by Absolute
of Accrual Quality (ABSAQ) and  Abso-
lute of Abnormal Accrual (ABSAA)
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COEC : cost of equity capital, measured by ad-
justed-EP Ratio
SIZE : size of the firm, measured by ln total
asset
AGE : age of firm, measured how longlisted
LEV : leverage, measured by total debt/ total
equity
LIQ : liquidity, measured by the current ratio
ROA : profitability, measured by return on asset
GROWTH: growth, measured by growth of net sales
MTBV : market to book value
Segment disclosures are standardized by dis-
closing them in notes to financial statements. Com-
panies may report income statements, assets and li-
abilities based on products, geographic areas and
key customers (PSAK 5, 2009). In addition, the com-
pany should provide consideration and judgment
on the creation of segments, accounting policies and
reconcile those reports.
Segment disclosure is measured by the seg-
ment disclosure checklist based on PSAK 5 Operat-
ing Segment (Revised 2009). For each item of the
checklist is assigned of 1 if the firm expressly dis-
closes and 0 if otherwise. N/A or Not Applicable
are given the item that is not be applied to the com-
pany. In addition, if any item information is reported
but not regulated by PSAK 5 Operating Segment
(Revised 2009), it is considered voluntary disclosure
and given a value of 1 for each item. The scoring is
got by divided score value of the company by total
required checklist.
Earning Quality is the profit that has the high
value added by the investor for decision making. If
the discretion of the manager is minimal, the re-
ported earnings will describe the actual economic
conditions. Previous research has formulated mea-
sures of earnings quality, including using the accrual
quality and the absence of earnings management.
This study uses two measures of earnings
quality. First, which is also used by Francis, Nanda,
& Olsson (2008) and Blanco, Lara, & Tribo (2014),
are the accrual quality (ABSAQ), developed by
Dechow & Dichev (2002) and modified by McNichols
(2002). Here is a model of the accrual quality equa-
tion:
The residual value produced by a model (4)
is variables which cannot be explained by the inde-
pendent variables. The accrual will be more quali-
fied if the residual value is a smaller value. So, the
earning quality of the research is the inverted form
of the residual value if the residue gets a smaller
value; the earning will be better quality. The study
also uses the absolute value of accrual quality be-
cause the study does not consider whether increas-
ing or decreasing earnings management motivation.
The second measurement is the Absolut Ab-
normal Accrual (ABSAA) which is the proxy of earn-
ings management. The study uses Jones’s (1991)
model. The residual of the Jones model equation
shows the earning quality, smaller of accrual (abso-
lute) produces better earning quality. Here is earn-
ing management by Jones’s (1991) model:
ܶܥܣ݅,ݐ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅,ݐ =  ߙ0,1 + ߙ1,݅ ܥܨܱ݅,ݐ−1ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ  + ߙ2,݅ ܥܨܱ݅,ݐܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅,ݐ  +                  ߙ3,݅ ܥܨܱ݅,ݐ+1ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅,ݐ  + ߙ4,1 ∆ܴܧܸ݅ ,ݐܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ +                  ߙ5,1 ܲܲܧ݅,ݐܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ  + ߝ݅,ݐ   (4)
ܶܣ݅ ,ݐ
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ−1 =  ߙ1,݅ 1ܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ−1  + ߙ2,݅ ∆ܴܧܸ݅ ,ݐܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ−1 +                     ߙ3,1 ܲܲܧ݅ ,ݐܣݏݏ݁ݐ ݅ ,ݐ−1  + ߝ݅ ,ݐ    (5)
TCA : total current accrual, measured by
 ∆ܥܣ݅ݐ − ∆ܥܮ݅ݐ − ∆ܥܽݏℎ݅ݐ + ∆ܵܶܦܧܤܶ݅ ݐ
otal accrual, measured by ∆ܥܣ݅ݐ − ∆ܥܮ݅ݐTA : total accrual, measured by+ ∆ܵܶܦܧܤܶ݅ ݐ
measured by ∆ܥܣ݅ݐ − ∆ܥܮ݅ݐ − ∆ܥܽݏℎ݅ݐ + ∆ܵܶܦܧܤܶ݅ ݐ −ܦܧܲ ݅ܰݐ  
Asset : average of total asset
Assett-1 : total asset t-1
CFO : cash flow from operating
CA : delta current asset
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CL : delta current liability
Cash : delta cash
STDEBT: delta debt for long term-debt
DEPN : depreciation and amortization expenses
Rev : delta revenue
PPE : property, plant, equipment (gross)
Cost of equity capital of the research measured
by Industry-Adjusted E/P Ratio (Muhammad &
Siregar, 2014). Measuring Industry-Adjusted E/P
Ratio is first, by determining the PER (price-earn-
ings ratio) of companies that available in Datastream.
Second, determine the EP (Earning-Price) value by
dividing PER by number 1. Third, the EP value of
each firm is reduced by the median of the industry
EP for each year. The higher the Industry-Adjusted
E/P Ratio shows, the higher the cost of equity capi-
tal of a company.
We did not take all the control variables in
the Blanco, Lara, & Tribo (2014) because the avail-
ability of data in Indonesia adjusts it and also re-
search findings of Indonesia companies. This study
uses control variables as in equations (1), (2) and
(3), namely: SIZE, is the size of the company mea-
sured from the natural logarithm of the total value
of the company’s assets; AGE, the age of the com-
pany, is from the age of listed companies on the
exchange; LEV, leverage which is the concentration
of debt in the firm’s capital structure (Jalila & Devi,
2012). The leverage used is the debt to equity ratio
(DER); LIQ, is the company’s liquidity that shows
the company’s strength from its ability to settle
short-term liabilities with existing short-term assets.
LIQ measurement with current ratio; ROA, Return
on Asset, is a proxy of company profitability (Andre,
Filip, & Moldovon, 2013); GROWTH, is the
company’s growth rate as measured by sales growth
divided by last year’s sales; MTBV, market to book
value is the value of the company’s stock (Dhaliwal
et al., 2011; Muhammad & Siregar, 2014; Abbas,
Habbe, & Pontoh, 2015).
RESULTS
Sampling method uses purposive sampling
based on the criteria of manufacturing companies
listed on the BEI in 2011-2013. Second criteria are
the company reported the multi-segment informa-
tion. The third is the company has a PER (Price Earn-
ings Ratio) data. The fourth is the company has no
negative equity value. The last is companies that
have accounting data required for research variables.
Table 1 presents the results of the sample se-
lection. Manufacturing companies listed during
2011–2013 are 399 firms-years. After the sample se-
lection process, the final result obtains 242 firms-
years. The sample represents 60.65 percent of the
populations.
Sample Selection Firms-Years 
Manufacturing companies listed during 2011-2013 399 
Companies that do not have segment information or a single segment or financial 
statement is available (2011 – 2013) 
(51) 
Companies do not have PER data (2011 – 2013) (65) 
Companies that have negative equity  (3) 
Companies that their accounting information is not completed (2011 – 2013) (41) 
Final Sample (unbalanced, firm-year) 242 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection Process
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Statistic descriptive is presented in Table 2 for
regression of earnings quality variables and table 3
for variables of main models. Statistic description
amount in Table 2 has been winsorized for all vari-
ables with double of standard deviation. The three
variables of cash flow have an average that is not
much different, and the average the cash flow of
the company grows periodically.
In Table 3, the segment disclosure rate
(SEGDISC) has an average of 0.46470, indicating that
the compliance level of the sample company to PSAK
5 is 46.47 percent or less than 50 percent. It is pos-
sible because companies are more likely to follow
Descriptive Statistics for Accrual Quality Variables  
(Winsorizing Data) 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P50 Max Skewness 
TCA 358 0.03795 0.13892 -0.44832 0.04412 0.49217 -0.45220 
CFOt-1 358 0.06278 0.10147 -0.20807 0.05126 0.31927 0.36773 
CFO 358 0.06863 0.11130 -0.20103 0.06056 0.34922 0.39747 
CFOt+1 358 0.07618 0.12207 -0.21590 0.06280 0.37582 0.28617 
DeltREV 358 0.15722 0.18785 -0.26000 0.13063 0.69123 0.72468 
PPE 358 0.76373 0.40634 0.04773 0.71009 2.01263 0.81581 
Descriptive Statistics for Abnormal Accrual Variables  
(Winsorizing Data) 
Variable N Mean Sd Min P50 Max Skewness 
TA 363 0.01047 0.15788 -0.44383 0.01138 0.56210 0.27627 
A 363 0.00000 0.00000  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 1.65685 
DeltREV 363 0.17897 0.21436 -0.28802 0.14479 0.79896 0.87762 
PPE 363 0.82927 0.42842  0.04357 0.77174 1.94622 0.57300 
 
Variable N Mean Sd Min Median Max 
COEC 242 0.02880 0.14190 -0.07846 0.00092 0.92958 
SEGDISC 242 0.46470 0.18137 0.11429 0.50000 0.77143 
ABSAA 242 0.09408 0.10494 0.00095 0.05815 0.53337 
ABSAQ 242 0.07487 0.09676 0.00031 0.03659 0.53292 
SIZE 242 21.30717 1.66310 17.96303 21.08677 26.07752 
AUD 242 0.41736 0.49414 0 0 1 
AGE 242 17.04132 6.67863 1 20 31 
LEV 242 61.01265 75.83832 0.00000 40.33638 596.89000 
LIQ 242 3.32033 15.86656 0.58380 1.66850 247.44400 
ROA 242 9.50649 7.72879 -13.58000 7.63500 46.32000 
GROWTH 242 0.16470 0.19065 -0.57659 0.14428 1.48547 
MTBV 242 2.55673 4.82323 0.18285 1.24887 46.62640 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Earning Quality Variables
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Hypotheses Testing Variables
OJK rules on segment reports that are not as de-
tailed in PSAK (Bapepam, VIII.G.7 regulations on
financial statements). A standard deviation of
ABSAQ (earnings quality) is better than ABSAA. It
shows that ABSAQ measurement is better in the
research. Control variables such as SIZE, LEV, LIQ,
ROA, and MTBV have a wide standard deviation.
These results indicate that the range between large
firms, large corporate capital structures of debt
proportions, low-value stocks, looks much different.
However, the models are still normally distributed.
KAP BIG 4 (AUD Variable) of the sample companies
also does not reach 50 percent, only 41.74 percent.
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Univariate Analysis
Based on the univariate correlation as shown
in 4, it is realised that the two earnings quality vari-
ables do not affect the cost of equity capital. In con-
trast to earnings quality, segment disclosure vari-
ables, both SEGDISC first order and fitted results,
significantly lower the cost of equity capital. The
results also show that the value of fitted influenced
by earnings quality has a stronger influence than
non-fitted. It indicates that there is simultaneous
influence between segment disclosure and earnings
quality to decrease of cost of equity capital. The re-
lationship of earnings quality and segment disclo-
sure level is also significant in the univariate test. It
means that firms with better earnings quality will
reveal much better segment information
Table 4 also shows the correlation between
other explanatory variables. However, according to
the VIF test for multivariate, the results show that
the model does not contain multicollinearity. Table
4 also explained that the variables of all control vari-
ables have a significant effect on the decrease in the
cost of equity capital, except growth which increases
the cost of equity capital. The result is reasonable
because when companies are growing, they need
more funding, so it will be easier to issue shares,
even at a discount.
Hypothesis Testing (Multivariate Analysis)
Univariate testing is an indication that gives
early evidence. For more details, here is a multi-
variate test for the three hypotheses presented ear-
lier. Table 5 presents the regression result of the
relationship. This result is a generalized least square
(GLS) regression because the model contains
heteroscedastic and autocorrelation. The model has
a normally distributed residue and VIF> 10 values
indicating free from multicollinearity. The GLS
model fixes the problem of classical assumptions by
not changing the coefficients so that the resulting
fitted value is also unchanged. The fitted value of
this equation will be used for second stage order
regression.
The first column (after column ‘prediction’) is
a basic model that only provides control variables
only, and then followed by the regression model
with ABSAQ and ABSAA model. The regression
results show the model having Adjusted-R-Square
respectively of 25.45 percent, 26.55 percent, 26.61
percent, which means that the model can be ex-
plained by independent variables respectively of
25.45 percent, 26 percent, 55 percent, 26.61 percent,
the rest explained by other variables outside the
model. The adding of the earnings quality variable
can increase Adj-R-square, it indicates that the vari-
 COEC fitt_sdiscl1 
fitt_sdis
cl2 
SEGDIS
CL 
ABSA
Q 
ABSA
A SIZE ROA GROWTH MTBV 
COEC 1.00          
Fit_SDISC1 -0.23*** 1.00         
Fit_SDISC2 -0.23*** 0.99*** 1.00        
SEGDISCL -0.20** 0.53*** 0.53*** 1.00       
ABSAQ -0.02 -0.39*** -0.36*** -0.21** 1.00      
ABSAA 0.01 -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.22*** 0.87*** 1.00     
SIZE -0.20** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.45*** -0.18** -0.17** 1.00    
ROA -0.15** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.14** 0.12* 0.22*** 1.00   
GROWTH 0.17** 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.13**   
MTBV -0.16** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.19** 0.03 0.06 0.25*** 0.69*** 0.05 1.00 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 4. Correlation of the Variables
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able is a good explanation variable of the model.
The p-value of 0.000 shows the fit model and well
used for estimation.
Both the proxies of earning quality, (ABSAQ)
and (ABSAA), show that the p-value of 0.0300 and
0.0270 that is smaller than a significant value of 5
percent (p-value < 0.05). It means that earning qual-
ity influence statistically segment disclosure. The
negative coefficient results are proved the predic-
tion that earning management affects negatively
segment disclosure. It means that earning quality
positively affects the level of disclosure segment
because earning quality is inverse from earning man-
agement.
The second test is the relationship between
the segment disclosure level and the cost of equity
capital. The test is performed before testing with
the second-order condition. The first column of
Table 6 (after the prediction column) shows the re-
sults of Hypothesis 2. The test shows that Adj-R-
Square is 8.28 percent, which indicates that the model
is explained by an independent variable of 8.28 per-
cent only and other variables outside the model
explain the rest. This result is higher than the result
of Muhammad & Siregar (2014) of 4.19 percent for
ܵܧܩܦܫܵܥ݅ݐ = ߙ0 + ߙ1ܧ ݅ܳݐ + ߙ2ܣܷܦ݅ݐ + ߙ3ܵܫܼܧ݅ݐ + ߙ4ܣܩܧ݅ݐ + ߙ5ܮܧܸ݅ ݐ + ߙ6ܮܫ ݅ܳݐ + ߝ݅ݐ    
Variable  Prediction Basic Model Model (ABSAQ) Model (ABSAA) 
Coef P-Value Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
ABSAQ -     -0.2250 0.0300   
ABSAA -         -0.2121 0.0270 
SIZE + 0.0446 0.0000 0.0426 0.0000 0.0428 0.0000 
AUD + 0.0448 0.0550 0.0427 0.0650 0.0415 0.0730 
AGE + 0.0011 0.4690 0.0009 0.5610 0.0009 0.5510 
LEV + -0.0004 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0020 
LIQ + -0.0011 0.0720 -0.0011 0.0690 -0.0011 0.0810 
Kons  -0.4917 0.0000 -0.4285 0.0030 -0.4298 0.0030 
R-Sq   27.00% 28.38% 28.44% 
Adj-R-Sq   25.45% 26.55% 26.61% 
P-Value   0.000 0.000 0.000 
SEG DISC = segment disclosure; ABSAQ= Absolut Accrual Quality; ABSAQ= Absolut Abnormal Accrual (ABSAA); AUD= audit quality; 
SIZE= size of firm; AGE= Age of firm; LEV= Leverage; LIQ= Liquidity 
 
Table 5. The Result of the Relationship between Earning Quality and Segment Disclosure Level
the full sample and similar result for data that elimi-
nates the negative beta.
The difference between this research and the
previous is an additional control variable of growth.
It means that the addition of the GROWTH vari-
able is considered appropriate in this study. The
model also has a better fit which is indicated by a p-
value of 0.000. SEGDISC variable shows a p-value
of 0.0600 that is smaller than a significant level of 10
percent, with a negative coefficient. The result indi-
cates that the segment disclosure level can lower
the cost of equity capital.
The next column in Table 6 is the result of
model 3.1 and model 3.2. They are the second-or-
der condition tests. The value of adj-R-square is 8.52
percent and 8.24 percent respectively for model 3.1
and 3.2. The Fit_Sdisc1 and Fit_sdisc2 results show
the p-value values of 0.030 and 0.035, respectively,
smaller than the significant level of 5 percent with a
negative coefficient. It means that disclosure of seg-
ments statistically can lower the cost of equity capi-
tal with earning quality as a mediation variable.
These results show a more significant result than
the results in the equation model (2).
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ܥܱܧܥ݅ݐ =     ߚ0 + ߚ1ܵܧܩܦܫܵܥ݅ݐ + ߚ2ܵܫܼܧ݅ݐ + ߚ3ܴܱܣ݅ݐ + ߚ4ܩܴܱܹܶܪ݅ݐ + ߚ5ܯܶܤܸ݅ ݐ + ߝ݅ݐ   
ܥܱܧܥ݅ݐ = ߛ0 + ߛ1ܵܧܩܦܫܵܥ෣ ݅ݐ + ߛ2ܧ ݅ܳݐ  + +ߛ3ܵܫܼܧ݅ݐ + ߛ4ܴܱܣ݅ݐ + ߙ5ܩܴܱܹܶܪ݅ݐ + ߛ6ܯܶܤܸ݅ ݐ + ߝ݅ݐ   
Variable  Prediction 
Model (2.1) Model (3.1) Model (3.2) 
Coef P-Value Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
SEGDISC - -0.1018 0.0600         
Fit_SDISC1 -     -0.4479 0.0300     
ABSAQ -     -0.1928 0.0770     
Fit_SDISC2 -         -0.4575 0.0350 
ABSAA -         -0.1471 0.1620 
SIZE + -0.0093 0.1180 0.0052 0.6290 0.0061 0.5790 
ROA + -0.0014 0.3660 -0.0003 0.8370 -0.0005 0.7500 
GROWTH + 0.1411 0.0020 0.1327 0.0040 0.1332 0.0040 
MTBV + -0.0019 0.4370 -0.0025 0.3190 -0.0023 0.3510 
Kons  0.2688 0.0220 0.1289 0.4020 0.1134 0.4670 
R-Sq   10.18% 10.80% 10.52% 
Adj-R-Sq   8.28% 8.52% 8.24% 
P-Value   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
SEG DISC = Segment Disclosure; ABSAQ= Absolut Accrual Quality; ABSAQ= Absolut Abnormal Accrual (ABSAA); Fit_SDISC1 = fitted 
result of first order regression (for mediation testing) of ABSAQ; Fit_SDISC2= fitted result of first order regression (for mediation testing) 
of ABSAA; SIZE= size of firm; ROA= return on asset; GROWTH= growth of sales; MTB= market to book value.  
 
Table 6. The result of Relationship Earning Quality, Segment Disclosure Level, and Cost of Equity Capital
SEG DISC = Segment Disclosure; ABSAQ=
Absolut Accrual Quality; ABSAQ= Absolut Abnor-
mal Accrual (ABSAA); Fit_SDISC1 = fitted result of
first order regression (for mediation testing) of
ABSAQ; Fit_SDISC2= fitted result of first order re-
gression (for mediation testing) of ABSAA; SIZE=
size of firm; ROA= return on asset; GROWTH=
growth of sales; MTB= market to book value. 
DISCUSSION
Hypothesis 1 stated that earning quality posi-
tively affects the level of disclosure segment. The
influence may indicate a complementary effect be-
tween the two information (Francis, Nanda, &
Olsson, 2008). The result finds that earning quality
positively affects the level of disclosure segment
because earning quality is inverse from earning
management.
The result is consistent with the results of
Blanco, Lara, & Tribo (2014) findings in US compa-
nies that earnings quality determines the level of
disclosure of segments. If the earning is quality, it
shows that the company also provides segment in-
formation better to users. These results support the
opinions of previous researchers who argued that
firms with good earnings quality would provide
more disclosure information. Verrecchia (1983) also
states that the increased quality of information en-
courages companies to disclose better because they
will accept more incentives. Francis, Nanda, &
Olsson (2008) also asserted that when investors have
a high precision of earnings information, they will
use other information. The company will be self-
confident that the segment information disclosed
will have an impact and incentive for the company.
A qualified earning is a representation of a
minimum of information asymmetry. The results
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prove that the segment disclosure level can mini-
mize information asymmetry. It supports the previ-
ous findings by Wang et al. (2011), and Blanco, Lara,
& Tribo (2014). The results show that the signifi-
cant positives indicate that there is a complemen-
tary effect between the quality of earnings and the
level of segment disclosure. It also supports Francis,
Nanda, & Olsson (2008) that studied voluntary dis-
closure. Investors will use segment information to
complement and clarify earnings information. This
is in line with the purpose of the segment reporting
providing detailed information that cannot be ob-
tained from the consolidated financial statement
(Chen & Zhang, 2003).
Five control variables are consistent across the
three models. Firm size, audit firms, and firm age
are consistent with previous researchers
(Muhammad & Siregar, 2014; Blanco, Lara, & Tribo,
2014). Leverage and liquidity results are contrary
to the prediction. It is possible that companies with
high leverage and liquidity are the small companies
that are still unable to provide detailed information
to borrowers.
The second test is the relationship between
the segment disclosure level and the cost of equity
capital. This investigation re-examined the previous
study with the same proxy that has been researched
by Muhammad & Siregar (2014). They do not get
evidence that segment disclosure influences the cost
of equity capital.
This research finds that the segment disclo-
sure level can lower the cost of equity capital. The
finding supports the findings of Saini & Hermann
(2012) who find that the segment disclosure de-
creases information asymmetry as well as capital
costs. The results are same by Pelaez, Lara, & Gine
(2009), Krabbenborg (2012), Semenenko & Yoo
(2012) as well as Abbas, Habbe, & Pontoh (2015).
As information asymmetry declines, it will encour-
age investors to invest as a result of reduced equity
capital costs. Operating segment report that com-
plies with PSAK 5 will help investors for proper
decision making, especially for their funding invest-
ment.
Although the result shows a marginal effect,
firms can improve the segment disclosure to pro-
vide better information to users. It will be able to
provide incentives for the company because based
on statistical results proven to lower the cost of eq-
uity capital.
The third finding indicates that disclosure of
segments statistically can lower the cost of equity
capital with earning quality as a mediation variable.
These results show a more significant result than
the results in the equation model (2). The earnings
quality variable experiences inconclusive results.
Using proxy of absolute accrual, there is evidence
that the earning quality of simultaneously with seg-
ment disclosure level can lower the cost of equity
capital. Results for earning management proxies do
not find any such evidence. Separate regression re-
sults without including segment level disclosure
variables (not tabulated), earnings quality, both
proxies, does not significantly affect the cost of eq-
uity capital.
The results show strong evidence of the role
of segment information in clarifying the quality of
corporate profits and also show that in addition to
the complementary effect between them in decreas-
ing in capital equity costs. In accordance with the
opinion of Chen & Zhang (2003), segment reports
provide detail information that is not obtained from
profit and loss, consolidated assets and liabilities.
When firms in more detail report segments, inves-
tors can analyze up to the business unit, making it
possible to entrust their funds to the firm because it
sees a profitable segment unit.
Second-order model of segment disclosure
level is more powerful impact compared to first or-
der regression model. The third result confirms that
the segment disclosure level plays a significant role
in illustrative the earning quality in lowering the
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cost of equity capital. The segment disclosure level
is proven that as a mediating variable on the nega-
tive relationship of earnings quality and in equity
capital costs. These results indicate that the segment
disclosure level is an endogenous variable
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
The result shows that, firstly, earnings qual-
ity positively influences segment disclosure level. It
indicates a complementary effect between them.
Secondly, in contrast to previous research in Indo-
nesia, this study found evidence that the higher level
of disclosure segments effect more decreasing the
cost of equity capital. The third result, with second
stage model, finds that earnings quality can lower
the cost of equity capital only if together with the
segment disclosure level.
Suggestions
This study has the following suggestion for
several parties. This study suggests to the standards
board that segment information based on IFRS adop-
tion has been reduced information asymmetry that
will lower the cost of equity capital. This research
suggests to investors that should use segment in-
formation in analyzing the company’s business. This
study indicates that companies should pay atten-
tion to segment information disclosure because it
can provide incentives for companies that are low-
ering the cost of equity capital. For future study,
the researcher may use the measurement of the cost
of equity capital as proposed by Botosan (1997) and
PEG from Easton. This study is not possible to use
such measurements because it requires up to t + 4,
while the beginning of the study period in 2011.
Further research can add some control variables,
such as corporate governance.
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